Ocean Freight in 2026: Rates After the Hormuz Crisis
- Ravi Shankar FICS
- Jul 13
- 17 min read
On 30 May 2026, the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index global composite closed the week at 2,572 points, up 16% from the week before and exactly double its level in late February, before the United States and Israel struck Iran. Hapag-Lloyd CEO Rolf Habben Jansen described what shippers were feeling in plain terms: when importers pay more for ocean freight, it is the same as going to the petrol station and finding a higher price posted. Source: Lloyd's List, 'Hormuz crisis side effect: a sharp rise in container shipping rates,' 30 May 2026.
Three weeks earlier, six of the industry's principal associations, ICS, BIMCO, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, IMCA, and OCIMF, jointly published navigational guidance for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. I sit on the ICS side of that table as Chairman of ICS Middle East. The guidance does not impose a rigid go or no-go rule. It establishes a structured decision process, leaving the master with overriding authority. Source: International Chamber of Shipping, 'Industry releases Strait of Hormuz navigational guidance,' 20 May 2026.
Ocean freight is the transport of cargo by sea, priced through a combination of a relatively stable base rate and a set of variable surcharges that respond to fuel cost, war risk, and port congestion. In 2026, the operative fact shippers need is that base ocean freight rates have stayed comparatively steady, while surcharges tied to the Strait of Hormuz crisis have driven total landed freight cost sharply higher, with the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index doubling between late February and late May 2026.
What Ocean Freight Actually Is and How Rates Are Built
Ocean freight moves cargo by sea. That sentence sounds too simple to need stating, until you try to explain to a shipper why their total cost per container has risen 40% while the carrier insists the base rate has barely moved.
Both things are true simultaneously. A carrier quotes a base freight rate, the core charge per container or per tonne for the voyage itself, and then layers on a series of surcharges that vary with conditions outside the base rate's scope. The Bunker Adjustment Factor, BAF, tracks fuel cost. War risk premium tracks insurance cost in specific high-threat transit zones. Congestion surcharges respond to port delay. Terminal Handling Charges, THC, cover loading and unloading at origin and destination. None of these is the base rate, and all of them show up on the same invoice.
Lloyd's List's reporting on the current crisis makes this distinction explicit: base freight rates have remained relatively steady through the disruption, while total transportation cost has climbed primarily because surcharges are being applied more frequently and at higher levels. I have sat in meetings where this exact distinction became the entire negotiation. A shipper arguing the carrier should absorb a cost increase is making a different argument than a shipper asking the carrier to justify a specific surcharge, and conflating the two gets nowhere.
The Strait of Hormuz Crisis: What Happened and What It Means for Rates
On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched military strikes against Iran, an operation the US government designated Operation Epic Fury. Within days, the Strait of Hormuz, the 21-mile-wide passage between Iran and Oman that normally carries roughly 20-25% of the world's seaborne oil trade and 20% of global LNG, was effectively closed. Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd suspended transits. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps issued warnings forbidding passage, carried out attacks on merchant vessels, and laid mines in the strait.
Source: Congressional Research Service, 'Iran Conflict and the Strait of Hormuz: Impacts on Oil, Gas, and Other Commodities,' Library of Congress, accessed 30 June 2026.
The commercial consequence arrived fast. Freightos's Head of Research, Judah Levine, reported that Shanghai-to-Jebel Ali container rates quadrupled, from under $2,000 to above $8,000 per container, in the weeks following the closure.
The wider east-west trade lanes moved less dramatically but still substantially. By the week ending 30 May, the SCFI Shanghai-US West Coast index stood at $4,149 per FEU, up 129% versus late February. The SCFI Shanghai-US East Coast index reached $5,333 per FEU, up 100%. The World Container Index assessed Shanghai-Los Angeles at $3,473 per FEU, up 59%, and Shanghai-New York at $4,597 per FEU, up 66%. Source: Lloyd's List, 30 May 2026.
Fuel cost explains a meaningful share of this. Very low sulphur fuel oil averaged $856 per tonne at the top 20 bunkering hubs that Thursday, up 68% from mid-February. High sulphur fuel oil averaged $736.50 per tonne, up 66%. VLSFO pricing tracks Brent crude closely, and Brent has moved with the conflict's trajectory, ExxonMobil senior vice president Neil Chapman warned publicly that dated Brent could spike to $150-$160 a barrel if the strait did not reopen within weeks.
Capacity tightened on top of the cost increase. MPC Container Ships CEO Constantin Baack told a quarterly earnings call that continued liner aversion to the Red Sea route reduces effective global container capacity by roughly 12%. Slow steaming, carriers throttling fleet speed to manage higher bunker costs, absorbs another 2%. Vessels diverting around the Cape of Good Hope add 10 to 20 days to Asia-Europe and Asia-North America East Coast voyages, removing that capacity from active rotation for longer per round trip even where the ships themselves are undamaged and fully operational.
Jebel Ali, the largest transshipment hub in the region, saw its feedering services into the Gulf collapse almost entirely during the closure's worst weeks, forcing cargo onto improvised routings through ports never designed to carry that volume.
Inside the Industry's Response: The ICS Joint Transit Guidance
Almost no general coverage of this crisis addresses the operational question underneath the headlines: once the strait reopens, even partially, how a master actually decides whether to attempt the transit.
Hundreds of vessels remained unable to transit the strait through the crisis's worst months. If conditions normalise even partially, the simultaneous movement of all those vessels through a single 21-mile passage represents a serious navigational hazard in its own right, independent of any remaining military threat. ICS, working jointly with BIMCO, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, IMCA, and OCIMF, published guidance on 20 May 2026 specifically to address this. Source: International Chamber of Shipping, 20 May 2026.
The same kind of structured, third-party risk assessment underpins how Lloyd's Register and ship classification work more broadly: a vessel's classification status does not eliminate operational risk, but it gives every party in a transaction a shared, verifiable reference point for assessing it.
The guidance does not set a rigid go or no-go threshold. It establishes a structured decision process intended to support voyage-specific threat and risk assessment, complementing the existing Best Management Practices Maritime Security framework rather than replacing it. Safety of life, safe navigation, and protection of the environment remain the stated primary considerations, and the master retains overriding authority over the final transit decision.
That design choice was not accidental, and it was not the only option on the table. A centrally mandated rule, transit only above threat level X, only in convoy, only with naval escort, would have been simpler to communicate and easier for flag states to enforce uniformly. The industry chose a structured-discretion model instead, because no single threshold can responsibly account for the variation between a VLCC carrying crude with a skeleton crew and a feeder container ship with a different risk profile entirely, transiting on a different day under different conditions. Preserving the master's authority is not a procedural footnote. It is the document's central judgment about where risk assessment authority actually belongs.
IMO ran a parallel track. The IMO Council called for a safe maritime framework to facilitate evacuation of merchant ships confined within the Gulf, and IMO proposed a phased evacuation plan, voluntary, consistent with the freedom of navigation rights embodied in UNCLOS and customary international law, covering SOLAS-regulated vessels confined in the Persian Gulf that wished to depart. As of late April 2026, IMO reported approximately 20,000 seafarers and 2,000 ships affected in the region. IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez stated plainly: 'No attack on innocent seafarers or civilian shipping is ever justified.' Source: IMO, Middle East hot topic page, continuously updated.
ICS Secretary-General Thomas A. Kazakos addressed the subsequent ceasefire directly, calling for 'a permanent return to vessels being able to pass through the Strait of Hormuz unimpeded without paying a toll or other clearance mechanism,' a pointed reference to Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority, established in early May 2026, which had begun requiring transit insurance and, by some reports, tolls exceeding $1 million per vessel during periods of partial reopening.
FCL vs LCL vs Bulk: Choosing the Right Shipment Method
The crisis has changed the FCL versus LCL calculation specifically, not just the overall cost level. LCL shipments consolidate cargo from multiple shippers into a single container at an origin warehouse, then deconsolidate at destination. Every additional day of port congestion, and UAE ports were reporting 7-10 day vessel bunching waits during the crisis's worst weeks, compounds against an LCL shipment twice: once at consolidation and again at deconsolidation. An FCL shipment absorbs the same congestion only once.
Method | Typical Volume | Cost Structure | 2026 Disruption Sensitivity | Best Suited For |
FCL (Full Container Load) | Single shipper fills a 20ft or 40ft container | Flat rate per container regardless of fill level | Lower: congestion impact applies once, at the single container's port handling | High-volume shippers; cargo sensitive to handling delay |
LCL (Less than Container Load) | Multiple shippers share container space | Per cubic metre or weight, whichever is greater | Higher: congestion compounds at both consolidation and deconsolidation | Lower-volume shippers willing to accept longer, less predictable transit |
Bulk | Unpackaged commodity cargo (grain, ore, liquid) | Charter rate, often negotiated per voyage | Variable: bulk carriers and tankers face the most direct Gulf-transit exposure | Commodity shippers with dedicated vessel charters |
Breakbulk | Oversized or non-containerisable cargo | Negotiated per shipment based on dimensions and weight | Moderate: fewer vessels operate this segment, so capacity tightening hits harder per available slot | Project cargo, machinery, oversized equipment |
Reading an Ocean Freight Invoice: Surcharges Explained
A shipper opening an invoice during this crisis sees line items that did not exist, or existed at near-zero, eighteen months ago.
Bunker Adjustment Factor (BAF): tracks fuel cost directly. With VLSFO up 68% and HSFO up 66% from mid-February levels by late May, per Lloyd's List, this is the single largest new surcharge category on most invoices.
War risk premium: an insurance cost specific to high-threat transit zones. War risk premiums for Strait of Hormuz transit rose from a baseline of 0.125% to between 0.2% and 0.4% of ship insurance value per transit in the days immediately before the February strikes, a quarter-million-dollar increase for a typical VLCC. Source: UNCTAD, 'Strait of Hormuz Disruptions Implications for Global Trade and Development,' official report, 2026.
Congestion surcharge: applied when a carrier's vessel faces extended port waiting time, currently elevated at Jeddah, Khorfakkan, Sohar, Fujairah, and Salalah, all of which were experiencing severe congestion as alternative routing concentrated volume onto ports never designed for it.
Emergency Gulf surcharge: a crisis-specific charge, reported as high as $3,000 per FEU on Gulf-linked corridors, distinct from the standard BAF and applied specifically to compensate for the operational risk and routing complexity of Gulf-touching shipments.
Not every surcharge on every invoice is equally defensible. BAF and war risk premium track directly to verifiable cost inputs, fuel price indices and insurance market rates respectively, and a shipper can check both against published benchmarks. Congestion and emergency surcharges are more discretionary, set by individual carriers rather than indexed to a public benchmark, and that is exactly where a shipper has room to negotiate.
The Counter-Consensus Case: Is Rerouting via the Cape the Wrong Default?
The reflexive industry response to this crisis has been blanket avoidance: route everything around the Cape of Good Hope, accept the 10-20 day delay, treat any Gulf-adjacent routing as categorically unacceptable risk.
I think that default is wrong for a meaningful share of shipments, and the joint ICS guidance is itself the evidence for why.
The guidance exists precisely because blanket avoidance was never going to be sustainable. Hundreds of vessels cannot simply wait indefinitely, and a structured, voyage-specific risk assessment process would not have been worth building if the industry's settled answer was always going to be 'never transit, full stop.' Freightos's own reporting confirms that Gulf-bound cargo has continued moving throughout the crisis, via west coast India transshipment into feeder services, via the Jeddah corridor through the northern Red Sea, precisely because some shippers and operators made the judgment that managed risk through documented alternative routing beat the certain cost of a 10-20 day Cape diversion for every single shipment regardless of cargo type or urgency.
This is not an argument for recklessness. It is an argument that 'always avoid' and 'never avoid' are both wrong defaults, and the actual professional judgment the ICS guidance is built to support sits between them, evaluated voyage by voyage, cargo by cargo, against current conditions rather than against a blanket policy set in February and never revisited.
Alternative Routing in Practice: India Transshipment and the Jeddah Corridor
Two specific alternative routings have absorbed Gulf-bound cargo throughout the crisis. The first transships through west coast India ports, then moves via feeder services into the accessible Oman and UAE ports, followed by road transport to final destination. The second runs via Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, accessed through the Mediterranean and the northern Red Sea rather than through the strait itself.
Neither route was designed to carry the volumes now passing through it. Port congestion, vessel bunching with reported waits of 7-10 days at some UAE ports, trucking shortages, and border-crossing complications all add delay and cost on top of the base routing complexity. Jeddah, Khorfakkan, Sohar, Fujairah, and Salalah have all reported severe congestion as a direct result. DHL Global Forwarding responded by launching dedicated capacity outside the standard ocean network entirely: three weekly Boeing 777F flights connecting Hanoi, Taipei, Anchorage, Chicago, and Cincinnati from 1 June 2026, alongside a Shanghai-Leipzig and Hong Kong-Liège air service launched 30 March. Tobias Maier, CEO of DHL Global Forwarding's Middle East and Africa unit, told customers the Strait of Hormuz situation would take at least four to six months to normalise.
What This Means for 2026-2027 Service Contracts
Maier's four-to-six-month forecast lands directly inside the window most shippers use to negotiate their next annual ocean freight service contract.
Update, late June 2026: the underlying conflict has not stood still since the 30 May data point this article is otherwise built on, and a shipper reading this in early July needs the fuller picture, not a snapshot that stopped moving in May. On 17 June, the US and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding intended to end the war and reopen the strait, and the Joint Maritime Information Center downgraded its threat assessment from CRITICAL toward SUBSTANTIAL in the days that followed. That reopening did not hold.
On 20 June, Iran announced it had closed the strait again, citing continued Israeli strikes in Lebanon as a breach of the agreement, a claim the US disputed. By late June, transit conditions were still moving week to week rather than settling in either direction, with sporadic attacks on individual vessels continuing alongside parallel diplomatic efforts in Doha. The practical consequence for a shipper is that the four-to-six-month normalisation window this article discusses is not a clean countdown, it is a volatile path with at least one false start already behind it, and any service contract negotiated now should assume further whiplash between partial reopening and re-closure rather than a straight line back to normal.
Carriers know this. Drewry's analysis, cited by Freightos, describes demand being pulled forward into June ahead of expected 1 July bunker fuel adjustments, supporting an early peak season in both the transpacific and Asia-Europe trades. Carriers are motivated to hold rates firm through exactly this contracting window, because a shipper locking in a service contract now is locking in pricing built on crisis-elevated cost assumptions that may or may not still apply by the contract's later months.
A shipper negotiating a 2026-2027 contract right now faces a genuine judgment call with no clean answer. Lock in a fixed rate now, and you are protected if the crisis extends through the contract term, but overpaying if conditions normalise faster than Maier's forecast suggests. Stay on spot exposure, and you carry the volatility risk directly, with Q2 2026 spot rates already showing the kind of swing that makes budgeting difficult. I do not think there is a single correct answer here.
The honest position is that this decision depends on a shipper's specific cargo mix, margin sensitivity, and risk tolerance more than on any general rule this article or any other can responsibly offer. The forwarder a shipper works with through this window matters more than usual too: how freight forwarding works after the DSV-Schenker consolidation shapes which forwarders have the scale and trade-lane relationships to actually secure space during a tight contracting season like this one.
Chokepoint Concentration Risk and Maritime Trade
The Strait of Hormuz crisis is not an aberration in how global maritime trade is structured. It is a vivid illustration of a structural feature that was true before February 2026 and remains true regardless of how this specific crisis resolves.
Roughly 20-25% of the world's seaborne oil trade and 20% of global LNG normally pass through a single 21-mile-wide passage. The same concentration logic applies to the Suez Canal, which the 2021 Ever Given grounding blocked for six days and an estimated $9-10 billion in trade disruption, and to the Panama Canal, where drought-driven draft restrictions have periodically constrained transits in recent years. Global maritime trade routes through a small number of geographic chokepoints by necessity, not by poor planning, and that concentration means a single regional event can cascade into a global rate and routing disruption with a speed that few other industries experience.
UNCTAD's formal March 2026 warning on this crisis specifically flagged that developing economies already facing high debt burdens and constrained fiscal space are disproportionately exposed to elevated freight and food costs from exactly this kind of chokepoint disruption, echoing the compounding shocks observed during COVID-19 and the early Ukraine war period. The same concentration logic that makes route risk hard to diversify away from is part of why net asset value in shipping moves as sharply as it does within a single quarter: a vessel's market value reflects exactly this kind of route and chokepoint exposure, priced fresh by a broker rather than smoothed over an accounting depreciation schedule.
Shipfinex/MAT Section: Asset-Level Exposure vs Route-Level Risk
Shipfinex FZCO, operating under VARA In-Principle Approval (IPA/26/01/002), structures Maritime Asset Tokens around a different relationship to route risk than the undifferentiated exposure a shipper or general maritime market participant typically carries. An IPA is not a full operational licence and is subject to completion of final regulatory requirements.
Maritime Asset Tokens (MATs) represent economic exposure to vessel-owning Special Purpose Vehicles, the same structure described in Shipfinex's guide to maritime asset tokenisation. Each SPV holds a specific, identifiable vessel, with its trade lane deployment and route exposure disclosed and assessable, rather than undifferentiated exposure to whichever routes the broader fleet of a large operator happens to service at any given time.
A vessel chartered on a long-term contract serving a route that does not touch the Strait of Hormuz carries a fundamentally different risk profile through this crisis than one deployed on a Gulf-linked spot trade, and that distinction is visible at the asset level in a way it is not in an undifferentiated equity position in a large, diversified operator.
This is the practical application of the chokepoint-concentration argument made above. Concentration risk in global maritime trade is structural and will not disappear once the current crisis resolves. An asset-level structure does not eliminate that risk, but it makes the specific exposure assessable rather than buried inside a large operator's combined fleet deployment across dozens of trade lanes simultaneously.
Where distributions are declared by the SPV, they are paid to token holders transparently and on-chain. MAT values may decline materially below purchase price if the underlying vessel's market value or operating performance deteriorates, including from route-specific disruption of exactly the kind described throughout this article. Secondary market liquidity for MATs is limited; early exit may not be possible.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why are ocean freight rates rising in 2026?
Ocean freight rates rose sharply through the first half of 2026 primarily due to the Strait of Hormuz crisis, which began on 28 February 2026 when the United States and Israel struck Iran, effectively closing a strait that normally carries roughly 20-25% of global seaborne oil trade. The Shanghai Containerized Freight Index doubled between late February and late May 2026, driven by elevated bunker fuel costs (VLSFO up 68% from mid-February levels), war risk insurance premiums, capacity reductions from Red Sea avoidance and slow steaming, and emergency surcharges on Gulf-linked corridors reaching up to $3,000 per FEU. Base freight rates have remained comparatively steady; the increase has come almost entirely through surcharges.
How does the Strait of Hormuz crisis affect container shipping?
The crisis affects container shipping through both direct and indirect channels. Directly, Gulf-linked routes saw the most severe impact, with Shanghai-to-Jebel Ali container rates quadrupling from under $2,000 to above $8,000 per container. Indirectly, the broader east-west network has been affected through fuel cost pass-through, reduced effective fleet capacity from Red Sea avoidance and slow steaming, and Cape of Good Hope rerouting adding 10-20 days to affected voyages. Jebel Ali, the region's largest transshipment hub, saw feedering services into the Gulf collapse during the crisis's worst weeks, forcing cargo onto alternative routings through ports not designed for the resulting volume.
What is the Cape of Good Hope reroute?
The Cape of Good Hope reroute is the alternative shipping route around the southern tip of Africa, used by vessels avoiding both the Red Sea and, during the 2026 crisis, Gulf-linked routes touching the Strait of Hormuz. It adds approximately 10 to 20 days to a typical Asia-Europe or Asia-US East Coast voyage compared to the standard route. While it adds significant transit time and fuel cost, it avoids the war risk and physical security threats associated with transiting an active conflict zone, making it the default choice for many operators during periods of acute Gulf or Red Sea disruption.
What is the difference between FCL and LCL?
FCL, Full Container Load, means a single shipper's cargo fills an entire container, charged at a flat rate regardless of how full the container actually is. LCL, Less than Container Load, means multiple shippers' cargo shares a single container, consolidated at origin and deconsolidated at destination, charged per cubic metre or weight. During periods of port congestion, such as the 2026 Hormuz crisis, LCL shipments face compounded delay risk because congestion affects both the consolidation and deconsolidation stages, while FCL shipments absorb port delay only once.
What is BAF in ocean freight?
BAF, the Bunker Adjustment Factor, is a surcharge that tracks fuel cost fluctuations separately from the base freight rate. It moves with bunker fuel prices, which themselves track Brent crude oil prices closely. During the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis, very low sulphur fuel oil prices rose 68% from mid-February levels by late May, and BAF surcharges rose correspondingly, becoming one of the largest single line items on many ocean freight invoices during this period.
How long does ocean freight take in 2026 given current disruptions?
Transit time in 2026 depends heavily on routing. Standard Asia-Europe or Asia-US East Coast voyages via normal routes typically take three to five weeks under stable conditions. Vessels diverting around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea face an additional 10 to 20 days on top of standard transit time. Cargo using alternative Gulf-adjacent routing, such as transshipment through west coast India ports or the Jeddah corridor, faces variable delay from port congestion and bunching, with some UAE ports reporting 7-10 day vessel waits during the crisis's worst weeks.
Is it safe to ship cargo through the Strait of Hormuz right now?
This depends on current, fast-changing conditions and cannot be answered with a fixed yes or no. The International Chamber of Shipping, jointly with BIMCO, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, IMCA, and OCIMF, published structured navigational guidance on 20 May 2026 specifically to support voyage-specific risk assessment rather than a blanket rule, leaving the vessel master with overriding authority over the transit decision. Shippers and operators should consult current guidance from these organisations, IMO's Middle East advisories, and their own war risk insurers before making a transit decision, rather than relying on a general statement that may be outdated by the time it is read.
How does the ICS joint transit guidance work?
The guidance, published 20 May 2026 by ICS, BIMCO, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, IMCA, and OCIMF, establishes a structured decision process for vessels considering transit through the Strait of Hormuz, rather than a rigid go or no-go threshold. It complements the existing Best Management Practices Maritime Security framework and is designed to support voyage-specific threat and risk assessment, accounting for variables like vessel type, cargo, crew composition, and current threat intelligence. Safety of life, safe navigation, and environmental protection are stated as the primary considerations throughout, and the master retains overriding authority over the final transit decision regardless of what the structured assessment process indicates.
Glossary
Ocean Freight: the transport of cargo by sea, typically priced through a base rate plus variable surcharges.
FCL (Full Container Load): a shipment occupying an entire container, billed at a flat rate.
LCL (Less than Container Load): a shipment sharing container space with other shippers' cargo, billed by volume or weight.
BAF (Bunker Adjustment Factor): a surcharge tracking fuel cost fluctuations separately from the base freight rate.
War Risk Premium: insurance cost specific to transit through designated high-threat zones, such as the Strait of Hormuz during periods of conflict.
THC (Terminal Handling Charge): the fee covering cargo loading and unloading at origin and destination ports.
Chokepoint: a narrow geographic passage through which a disproportionate share of global maritime trade must transit, creating concentrated disruption risk.
SCFI (Shanghai Containerized Freight Index): a benchmark index tracking spot container freight rates from Shanghai across major global trade lanes.
Transshipment: the practice of moving cargo from one vessel to another at an intermediate port rather than direct routing to final destination.
Freedom of Navigation: the principle under UNCLOS and customary international law that vessels have the right to transit international straits and waters without obstruction.
DISCLAIMER: Ravi Shankar FICS is Chief Commercial Officer of Shipfinex, a maritime asset tokenization platform operating under VARA In-Principle Approval (IPA/26/01/002) in Dubai, and Chairman of ICS Middle East. This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a financial promotion. Maritime Asset Tokens are VARA-regulated virtual assets backed by physical maritime assets held through ring-fenced SPVs. MAT values may decline materially below purchase price. In extreme scenarios (e.g. vessel total loss), residual scrap and salvage value provides a floor, but material capital impairment is possible. Distributions are not guaranteed. Secondary market liquidity is limited; early exit may not be possible.
Ravi Shanker
Co-Founder & CCO, Shipfinex
Ravi Shankar FICS is Co-Founder and Chief Commercial Officer of Shipfinex, and General Secretary of the ICS Middle East Branch. A Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers with extensive experience in ship sale and purchase, chartering, and maritime consultancy, he has previously held senior roles at Maersk Broker and Eastgate Shipping DMCC. His day-to-day commercial work spans dry bulk and tanker market analysis, SnP transactions, and shipbroking advisory.
